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In this paper we use data from the Afrobarometer surveys to demonstrate that there is an 
undesirable spill-over from petty corruption in the public sector to trust in private sector 
institutions. Our results show that experiencing bribery in the course of one’s interactions 
with the public sector lowers one’s trust in big private corporations, small businesses, and 
local traders. This finding holds even when we allow for perceptions of political corruption 
to enter the specification. We do not find any significant association between a measure of 
interpersonal trust and bribery experience which suggests that our findings with regards to 
market institutions are not driven by corruption lowering trust in general. Having to pay a 
bribe for household services, which is perhaps the setting most like a private sector 
transaction, is the corrupt interaction most strongly associated with the decline in private 
sector trust. We find some evidence that the spill-over is larger in democracies than in 
non-democratic regimes. Given the importance of trust in market institutions for the 
efficient functioning of an economy, our findings thus point to a previously unknown and 
potentially substantial cost of corruption and add to the case for anti-corruption efforts. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
There is a long standing literature that argues that trust is an essential economic lubricant. For 
example, trust has been shown to be important for growth and development (Knack and 
Keefer, 1997; Zak and Knack, 2001). It is most often asserted that this operates via a 
reduction in transaction costs. On the other hand, corruption, the abuse of public power for 
private gain, has been found by many researchers to be sand in the wheels of an economy. 
Macro evidence suggests that corruption is detrimental to economic growth (Mauro, 1995), 
though perhaps only in institutional settings that are otherwise strong (Aidt et al, 2008), and 
to foreign direct investment inflows (Wei, 2000). Similarly, Fisman and Svensson (2007) find 
that bribery has a negative effect on firm growth. This paper examines the relationship 
between these two important social forces in that we ask if individuals who experience 
corruption in their dealings with the public sector are more or less likely to trust the private 
sector.  
It is not obvious what the association between experiencing public sector corruption and trust 
in the private sector should be. On the one hand, if one has to pay a bribe to an agent of one’s 
state, one may feel more inclined to view favourably the institutions of the private sector. 
That is to say that because people may see the private sector as the natural alternative to the 
public sector, an experience of petty public sector corruption could encourage individuals to 
trust businesses more. Alternatively, perhaps one would become more cynical about the legal 
protections available to them in the event of private sector malfeasance and consequently be 
less likely to trust the private sector. A mechanism similar to this is uncovered by Raiser et al 
(2008) who show that trust between firms in transition economies is higher where there is 
confidence in the rule of law. Using data from the Afrobarometer surveys, we find that there 
is a negative association between experiencing corruption and trust in the private sector. This 
result is robust to the inclusion of perceptions of political and business corruption and it is 
evident with regards to trust in all layers of the private sector. 
Trust is essential when complete or legally binding contracts are impossible; in other words, 
in a situation of asymmetric or imperfect information (Williamson, 1985). This applies to 
many different settings, from customer credit and wage agreements to policy-making and is 
perhaps particularly important in developing economies where legal protection is weak and or 
costly. In addition to its role in reducing transaction costs, trust in management is positively 
associated with valued work behaviours and attitudes (Dirks and Ferrin, 2002). Similarly, 
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variation in social capital (a concept closely related to generalized trust) affects confidence in 
national institutions (Brehm and Rahn, 1997). Generalized trust between citizens also 
facilitates resolution of collective action problems (Coleman, 1990; Putman, 1993). 
Relatedly, Den Butter and Mosch (2003) argue that mutual trust between government, unions 
and employers, the central bank, and advisory bodies was the driving force behind the Dutch 
recovery that began in the 1980s. La Porta et al (1997) demonstrate that trust is important for 
a wide range of macro level outcomes including governance and infrastructure. Trust has also 
been shown to matter for investment behaviour (Guiso et al, 2008; Georgarakos and Pasini, 
2011; Klein and Shtudiner, 2015), labour market participation (Tu and Bulte, 2010), the level 
of TFP and its growth rate (Bjørnskov and Méon, 2015), and human and physical capital 
accumulation (Dearmon and Grier, 2011). Interpersonal trust is also important in terms of 
support for and the effectiveness of redistributive policies (Daniele and Geys, 2015; Bergh 
and Bjørnskov, 2014). Another strand of the trust literature has shown that generalised trust 
facilitates deregulation of business (Heinemann and Tanz, 2008; Aghion at al 2010; Pinotti, 
2012; Leibrecht and Pitlik, 2015) which is a factor that has been shown to matter in terms of 
growth and development (Djankov et al, 2006; Gillanders and Whelan, 2014).  Although 
Peiró-Palomino and Tortosa-Ausina (2013) demonstrate that the beneficial effect of trust on 
GDP per capita varies with the level of development, the literature thus suggests that, on 
average, a high level of trust has the potential to make a society better off and more equal.  
While trust tends to lower transactions costs, corruption can act as an unofficial tax on many 
activities and can also increase uncertainty.  For example, corruption increases the burden of 
regulation and red tape (Guriev, 2004; Breen and Gillanders, 2012). Huntington (1968) 
argues that corruption could “grease the wheels” of economic activity in poor institutional 
settings and both Méon and Weill (2010) and Dreher and Gassebner (2011) provide some 
evidence in support of this assertion. However, the weight of evidence suggests that 
corruption is damaging in terms of many outcomes at the individual, firm, and country level.  
The importance of trust for economic outcomes has given rise to a literature that has sought 
to understand the causes and correlates of trust. These papers tend to study mainly 
generalized trust, i.e. trust towards other people (Glaeser et al, 1999; Alesina and Ferrara, 
2002; Bjornskov, 2007; Dohmen et al, 2008; Yamamura, 2008; Corbacho et al, 2015). Given 
the apparent importance of trust and corruption to an economy, it should come as no surprise 
that the links between corruption and dimensions of trust have been studied in the past. Many 
authors have concluded that the perception of corruption and/or an experience of corruption 
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are highly corrosive to trust in the state and its agents (Seligson, 2002; Anderson and 
Tverdova, 2003; Chang and Chu, 2006; Armah-Attoh et al, 2007; Lavallee et al, 2008; Morris 
and Klesner, 2010; Blanco, 2013), to interpersonal trust (Seligson, 2002; Uslaner, 2004; 
Banerjee, 2015), and even to opinions regarding non-domestic institutions (Torgler, 2008; 
Breen and Gillanders, 2015). 
Our paper, however, is primarily concerned with explaining trust in the broad institutions of 
the private sector. One can readily see how this type of trust is vital for the efficient 
functioning of an economy. Individuals interact with the private sector as consumers, 
workers, investors, and even as policy-makers and regulators. If they have little trust in the 
private sector then they will make different choices than those who trust the private sector to 
deliver on its promises regarding the quality of goods, wage contracts, credit contracts, or 
regulation. This aspect of trust has received some attention in the recent past. Adams et al. 
(2010) study the determinants of distrust in corporations and show that ideological and 
psychological traits such as liberalism and cynicism correlate with corporate distrust. 
Ingenhoff and Sommer (2010) study trust in companies and CEOs and conclude that trust in 
companies and trust in CEOs differ and are influenced by different factors.  
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes our data and empirical 
approach. Section 3 presents our results and Section 4 concludes.  
 
2 DATA AND APPROACH 
For the most part, the data for this paper comes from Round 2 of the Afrobarometer. The 
Afrobarometer project collects data from representative surveys and contains information on 
attitudes and social and economic conditions.1 Round 2 was carried out in 2002-2003 and 
covered Botswana, Cape Verde, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Malawi, Mali, Mozambique, 
Namibia, Nigeria, Senegal, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. While 
many rounds have information on corruption experience, only Round 2 has information 
regarding trust in private sector institutions.  
                                                          
1 The data, the original questionnaire, and the full methodology can be obtained from www.afrobarometer.org. 
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We have measures of trust in the private sector at three levels: big private corporations, small 
business and shopkeepers, and traders in local markets. They come from the following survey 
question: 
How much do you trust each of the following, or haven’t you heard enough about them to 
say? 
• Big private corporations  
• Small businesses/shopkeepers 
• Traders in local markets 
 
Respondents could answer on a scale from “not at all” to “a very great deal.” While we use 
the original ordered responses as a robustness test, for simplicity in most of the analysis 
below we use a dummy variable for each level of the private sector that takes a value of zero 
if the answer was “Not at all” or “A little bit” and a value of one if the answer was “A lot” or 
“A very great deal”.  Note that we have information regarding people’s attitudes to the entire 
spectrum of private sector activity; from the large and opaque corporations to the familiar and 
knowable local traders. We examine each of these separately as these issues of transparency 
and familiarity might give rise to qualitatively or quantitatively different relationships 
between public sector corruption and trust in the private sector depending on the level in 
question. 
 
Our chief explanatory variable of interest captures an individual’s experiences of petty 
corruption. We make use of the answers to the following questions: 
In the past year, how often (if ever) have you had to pay a bribe, give a gift, or do a 
favour to government officials in order to: 
• Get a document or a permit?  
• Get a child into school?  
• Get a household service (like piped water, electricity, or phone)?  
• Avoid a problem with the police (like passing a checkpoint or avoiding a fine or 
arrest)? 
Each of these questions can be answered “never”, “once or twice”, “a few times” and “often” 
to which we assign the values from 0 to 3 respectively. By summing over these four 
categories, we obtain an index of bribery experience that ranges from 0 to 12, where higher 
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values correspond to a more extensive experience of paying bribes.2 Note that the question 
explicitly refers to bribes paid to government officials.  Such self-reported information could 
in principle be subject to biases and lead to an endogeneity problem in that less trusting 
people might be prone to embellishing their corruption experience history. Thus, as a 
robustness test we use a simple dummy variable that takes a value of one if the respondent 
has any reported history at all of paying a bribe in any of the above situations. The idea here 
is that while people might exaggerate, they are less likely to completely invent a history of 
bribe paying when none exists. 
Table A1 presents summary statistics and full definitions for the other variables used in the 
paper. One can see that trust in the private sector is middling with each of our trust dummies 
having a mean of around 0.4. While the means are similar, Table A2 shows that the 
correlations between the three types of trust (measured on the ordered 0-3 scale) are not 
overly high. One can hold different levels of trust for different types of actor. Looking at the 
correlations of these measures with another dimension of trust, trust in the courts, further 
supports this idea. One’s trust in the private sector and one’s trust in the state can be different. 
Table A1 also tells us that 23% of people in our sample have had some experience of bribery 
(in the situations that the survey asks about) in the recent past. 
We estimate probit models where the private sector trust dummies are the dependent variable 
and corruption experience is our main explanatory variable of interest. We include country 
dummies to account for cross country differences in the level of trust and we cluster the 
standard errors at the country and region level. We control for a number of characteristics that 
are common in the trust literature. These are defined in Table A1.3 Our most important 
control is the individual’s perceptions of political corruption.  This is constructed from the 
following survey element: 
How many of the following people do you think are involved in corruption, or haven’t 
you heard enough about them to say? 
• The President and Officials in his Office  
• Elected leaders, such as parliamentarians or local councillors 
• Government officials 
                                                          
2 Round 2 also asks about bribes paid to cross a border and “for anything else.” We omit these as in the former 
case we do not know if the bribe was paid to agents of the respondent’s own country or of another and in the 
latter case very few people indicated that they had done so. This also allows us to generate the exact same index 
when we use the Round 3 data to study interpersonal trust. 
3 Our results are robust to using income decile as an alternative to the poverty index. 
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Each of the questions can be answered “none”, “some of them”, “most of them” and “all” to 
which we assign the values from 0 to 3 respectively. By summing these we obtain an index of 
perceptions of political corruption that ranges from 0 to 9. 
We control for perceptions of corruption for several reasons. First of all, it has been well 
established in the literature referenced above that perceptions of political corruption are 
damaging to some dimensions of trust.  One’s experiences of petty corruption could inform 
one’s perceptions of grand corruption and so for the purposes of our research question it is 
important to see if experiences play a role in private sector trust formation holding 
perceptions constant. In addition, Round 2 of the Afrobarometer lacks a measure of 
interpersonal trust. We wish to take account of an individual’s general level of trust and 
controlling for their perceptions of political corruption is a reasonable proxy for this to the 
extent that perceptions of corruption reflect an expectation that some people in the society 
will behave in an opportunistic manner to benefit themselves at the expense of others. As an 
alternative we use a dummy variable capturing trust in the courts. This gives us 
approximately 3000 more observations.  
The literature outlined in Section 1 has noted that interpersonal trust and political trust are 
likely endogenous with regards to corruption. The level of interpersonal trust and political 
trust in a society might make corruption more or less permissible, effective, and necessary, 
and it may also change the perceptions of corruption. While the experimental work of 
Banerjee (2015) concludes that corruption has an effect on trust but not the other way around, 
we acknowledge that this is far from a settled issue. Moreover, our finding of a negative 
association between the experience of corruption and private sector trust could in principle be 
driven by people with low trust in the private sector availing of the public sector more often 
and thus encountering bribery situations more often. We offer several rebuttals to these and 
related endogeneity concerns. Firstly, some of the situations for which we have information 
on bribery demands are not situations that are alternatives to the private sector.  Secondly and 
relatedly, while this story is plausible with regards to big private corporations which can 
provide goods and services that have a public sector counterpart it is less convincing when it 
comes to small local traders. As we will see, our results are qualitatively the same at each 
level of the private sector and the sizes of the coefficients are also very similar.  Thirdly, in 
some specifications we also control for perceptions of corruption in business which could 
shape both trust in the private sector and corruption experiences, and in a robustness check 
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we control for ideology. Finally, in a robustness exercise we swap our individual experience 
of corruption variable for the average in the respondent’s survey region. In all cases, our main 
result survives.  
 
3 RESULTS 
3.1 Main Results 
Tables 1, 2, and 3 present our main results. Table 1 uses trust in big private corporations as 
the dependent variable. Column 1 tells us that those who experience bribery in the public 
arena are less likely to trust big private corporations. The magnitude of the marginal effect is 
meaningful. Someone with a bribery index score of 3 is 3.3% less likely to express trust in 
private corporations.  This is comparable to the effect of being a woman and to the effect of 
having some secondary education. Column 2 shows that perceptions of political corruption 
are a strong predictor of this type of trust. Column 3 presents our central finding. Even when 
one controls for perceptions of corruption experiencing bribery is a significant predictor of 
trust in the private sector. 
Column 4 swaps the bribery index for the bribery dummy and reaches the same conclusion. 
Holding corruption perceptions constant, any experience of bribery reduces one’s trust in big 
private corporations by 3.6%. Column 5 substitutes trust in the courts for perceptions of 
corruption. This does not change our results.4 Finally, Column 6 allows perceptions of how 
corrupt foreign and local businessmen are. Neither of these variables is significant in the case 
of trust in big private corporations.5  
  
                                                          
4 As alternatives, we also used dummies for trust in the parliament, the army and the police. Our results were 
unchanged. 
5 If we try and explain perceptions of how corrupt local and foreign businessmen are then experience of bribery 
matters but only if we exclude perceptions of political corruption. 
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TABLE 1: Trust in Big Private Corporations 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
Bribery experience -0.0113***  -0.00902***  -0.00858*** -0.00876*** 
(0-12 scale) (0.00299)  (0.00319)  (0.00280) (0.00337) 
Corruption Perceptions  -0.0164*** -0.0157*** -0.0158***  -0.0141*** 
(0-9 scale)  (0.00359) (0.00368) (0.00370)  (0.00377) 
Bribery experience    -0.0366***   
(dummy)    (0.0131)   
Trust in courts     0.324***  
(dummy)     (0.0146)  
       
Age 0.000154 0.000220 0.000124 0.000111 0.000321 0.000123 
 (0.000353) (0.000420) (0.000417) (0.000416) (0.000361) (0.000429) 
Female -0.0236*** -0.0247*** -0.0272*** -0.0275*** -0.0253*** -0.0214** 
 (0.00707) (0.00795) (0.00819) (0.00816) (0.00727) (0.00891) 
Some secondary  -0.0394*** -0.0354** -0.0350** -0.0351** -0.0251* -0.0261 
education  (0.0131) (0.0157) (0.0158) (0.0158) (0.0130) (0.0165) 
Secondary education -0.0918*** -0.0809*** -0.0815*** -0.0810*** -0.0594*** -0.0761*** 
 (0.0174) (0.0195) (0.0195) (0.0194) (0.0167) (0.0204) 
Some university  -0.0573*** -0.0489** -0.0494** -0.0497** -0.0371* -0.0502** 
education (0.0217) (0.0227) (0.0237) (0.0236) (0.0200) (0.0243) 
University education -0.0578* -0.0453 -0.0441 -0.0459 -0.0294 -0.0279 
 (0.0310) (0.0322) (0.0333) (0.0330) (0.0326) (0.0343) 
Poverty index -0.00344** -0.00384** -0.00371** -0.00378** -0.00357** -0.00417** 
(0-24 scale) (0.00163) (0.00183) (0.00181) (0.00182) (0.00151) (0.00191) 
Rural -0.0350** -0.0364** -0.0381** -0.0379** -0.0277* -0.0406** 
 (0.0149) (0.0169) (0.0169) (0.0168) (0.0145) (0.0180) 
Businessman 0.00410 0.0127 0.0136 0.0136 0.0137 0.00827 
 (0.0187) (0.0206) (0.0200) (0.0199) (0.0188) (0.0198) 
Professional worker -0.0422** -0.0426* -0.0380* -0.0378* -0.0414** -0.0321 
 (0.0204) (0.0219) (0.0219) (0.0221) (0.0208) (0.0222) 
Government worker 0.00737 0.0107 0.0129 0.0125 -0.0113 0.0205 
 (0.0255) (0.0264) (0.0263) (0.0263) (0.0244) (0.0276) 
Farmer 0.0202 0.0217 0.0231* 0.0226 0.00903 0.0263* 
 (0.0139) (0.0138) (0.0139) (0.0139) (0.0138) (0.0142) 
Active member of  -0.0168 -0.0234* -0.0225 -0.0224 -0.0218* -0.0266* 
religious community (0.0124) (0.0136) (0.0139) (0.0138) (0.0118) (0.0144) 
       
Foreign business corruption      0.00313 
(dummy)      (0.0158) 
Local business corruption      -0.0263 
(dummy) 
Country Dummies 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
(0.0163) 
Yes 
       
Observations 17,562 14,037 13,732 13,732 17,192 12,438 
Notes: Probit marginal effects reported. The corresponding standard errors are clustered by country and region 
and reported in parentheses.*, **, and *** indicates significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. 
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Tables 2 and 3 repeat the analysis for the other levels of the private sector. For both trust in 
small business and trust in local traders we mostly find the same results as we did in the case 
of trust in big corporations. Experiencing corruption is detrimental in terms of one’s trust in 
these aspects of the private sector. The chief difference across the tables is the role of 
perceptions of how involved foreign and local businesses are in corruption. We already noted 
that these variables are not significant predictors of trust in large corporations. However, as 
Column 6 of Table 2 shows, in the case of small businesses they do seem to matter. A sense 
that foreign business people are involved in corruption tends to lead to more trust in small 
business whereas the opposite is true for the perception that local business people are 
involved in corruption. The significance level of corruption experiences drops to 10% in this 
case. Column 6 of Table 3 tells us that a perception of local businesses being involved in 
corruption matters for trust in local traders. Here, the perception of foreign involvement is 
insignificant. Corruption experiences are significant at 5% in this specification.  
Our results thus tell a clear story: petty corruption in the public sector arena has a meaningful 
and undesirable spill over in terms of trust in, and hence the efficient functioning of, the 
private sector.  As mentioned in Section 1 one could think of reasons for the spill over to be 
negative or positive. In so far as trust is important to economic efficiency, this is a price that 
is paid from large corporations down to small traders in local markets, and indeed by those 
who interact with them and the economy in general. Perhaps surprisingly given the 
differences between an individual’s relationship to big private corporations and to his local 
traders, the extent of this spill-over is much the same at each level of the private sector. Thus 
this exercise has uncovered a new cost to petty corruption. Corruption throws sand in the 
economic grease that is trust in the private sector.  
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TABLE 2: Trust in Small Businesses 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
Bribery experience -0.00924***  -0.00638**  -0.00658** -0.00668* 
(0-12 scale) (0.00301)  (0.00311)  (0.00301) (0.00353) 
Corruption Perceptions  -0.0140*** -0.0137*** -0.0137***  -0.0129*** 
(0-9 scale)  (0.00306) (0.00319) (0.00320)  (0.00328) 
Bribery experience    -0.0296**   
(dummy)    (0.0121)   
Trust in courts     0.303***  
(dummy)     (0.0119)  
       
Age -0.000129 0.000018 0.000011 -0.000004 -0.000012 0.000156 
 (0.000308) (0.000324) (0.000327) (0.000325) (0.000332) (0.000332) 
Female -0.0227*** -0.0277*** -0.0293*** -0.0298*** -0.0245*** -0.0225*** 
 (0.00703) (0.00775) (0.00783) (0.00776) (0.00676) (0.00848) 
Some secondary  -0.0510*** -0.0411*** -0.0401*** -0.0400*** -0.0380*** -0.0350** 
education (0.0121) (0.0136) (0.0136) (0.0137) (0.0117) (0.0144) 
Secondary education -0.113*** -0.102*** -0.0995*** -0.0989*** -0.0852*** -0.0951*** 
 (0.0130) (0.0146) (0.0146) (0.0147) (0.0122) (0.0161) 
Some university  -0.0833*** -0.0719*** -0.0691*** -0.0691*** -0.0654*** -0.0636*** 
education (0.0184) (0.0199) (0.0207) (0.0207) (0.0170) (0.0221) 
University education -0.0657** -0.0585* -0.0497 -0.0509 -0.0411 -0.0310 
 (0.0321) (0.0351) (0.0354) (0.0354) (0.0327) (0.0361) 
Poverty index -0.00274* -0.00244 -0.00217 -0.00220 -0.00249* -0.00220 
(0-24 scale) (0.00150) (0.00173) (0.00167) (0.00168) (0.00139) (0.00176) 
Rural -0.0405*** -0.0404** -0.0416** -0.0414** -0.0314** -0.0385** 
 (0.0143) (0.0167) (0.0162) (0.0162) (0.0142) (0.0167) 
Businessman 0.0412* 0.0347 0.0403 0.0407 0.0559** 0.0322 
 (0.0242) (0.0255) (0.0256) (0.0256) (0.0234) (0.0253) 
Professional worker -0.0136 -0.0114 -0.00874 -0.00824 -0.0105 -0.0132 
 (0.0211) (0.0231) (0.0233) (0.0235) (0.0213) (0.0218) 
Government worker 0.0114 0.0191 0.0185 0.0181 -0.00697 0.0205 
 (0.0232) (0.0254) (0.0255) (0.0254) (0.0228) (0.0259) 
Farmer 0.0168 0.0218* 0.0226* 0.0223* 0.00686 0.0276* 
 (0.0127) (0.0130) (0.0133) (0.0133) (0.0126) (0.0144) 
Active member of  -0.0103 -0.0136 -0.0130 -0.0127 -0.0106 -0.0166 
religious community (0.0136) (0.0149) (0.0152) (0.0152) (0.0135) (0.0141) 
       
Foreign business corruption      0.0347** 
(dummy)      (0.0150) 
Local business corruption      -0.0492*** 
(dummy)      (0.0135) 
Country Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
Observations 19,508 15,265 14,887 14,887 18,977 13,178 
Notes: Probit marginal effects reported. The corresponding standard errors are clustered by country and region 
and reported in parentheses.*, **, and *** indicates significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. 
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TABLE 3: Trust in Local Traders 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
Bribery experience -0.00973***  -0.00752***  -0.00690*** -0.00787** 
(0-12 scale) (0.00272)  (0.00287)  (0.00262) (0.00328) 
Corruption Perceptions  -0.0112*** -0.0109*** -0.0110***  -0.00857** 
(0-9 scale)  (0.00331) (0.00348) (0.00350)  (0.00360) 
Bribery experience    -0.0295**   
(dummy)    (0.0121)   
Trust in courts     0.292***  
(dummy)     (0.0125)  
       
Age -0.000092 -0.000033 -0.000070 -0.000085 0.000032 0.000095 
 (0.000315) (0.000363) (0.000356) (0.000356) (0.000330) (0.000374) 
Female -0.0253*** -0.0345*** -0.0386*** -0.0388*** -0.0265*** -0.0317*** 
 (0.00738) (0.00734) (0.00776) (0.00772) (0.00713) (0.00849) 
Some secondary  -0.0539*** -0.0447*** -0.0455*** -0.0455*** -0.0404*** -0.0424*** 
education (0.0124) (0.0147) (0.0143) (0.0143) (0.0125) (0.0146) 
Secondary education -0.115*** -0.101*** -0.102*** -0.101*** -0.0885*** -0.0971*** 
 (0.0139) (0.0162) (0.0157) (0.0157) (0.0128) (0.0165) 
Some university  -0.106*** -0.0980*** -0.100*** -0.101*** -0.0902*** -0.0926*** 
education (0.0168) (0.0181) (0.0188) (0.0187) (0.0160) (0.0201) 
University education -0.0954*** -0.0910*** -0.0843*** -0.0858*** -0.0696** -0.0729** 
 (0.0290) (0.0310) (0.0313) (0.0310) (0.0289) (0.0306) 
Poverty index -0.00269* -0.00214 -0.00176 -0.00182 -0.00241* -0.00181 
(0-24 scale) (0.00142) (0.00163) (0.00157) (0.00159) (0.00132) (0.00167) 
Rural -0.0390*** -0.0465*** -0.0426*** -0.0425*** -0.0302** -0.0403*** 
 (0.0137) (0.0154) (0.0149) (0.0150) (0.0136) (0.0154) 
Businessman 0.0305 0.0315 0.0343 0.0341 0.0437** 0.0263 
 (0.0220) (0.0232) (0.0233) (0.0232) (0.0205) (0.0222) 
Professional worker -0.0256 -0.00905 -0.00955 -0.00918 -0.0246 -0.00769 
 (0.0243) (0.0249) (0.0254) (0.0255) (0.0239) (0.0278) 
Government worker -0.00351 -0.000644 -0.000480 -0.000745 -0.0174 0.00833 
 (0.0235) (0.0252) (0.0254) (0.0255) (0.0232) (0.0257) 
Farmer 0.0112 0.00864 0.00859 0.00829 0.000413 0.0153 
 (0.0109) (0.0113) (0.0117) (0.0117) (0.0108) (0.0126) 
Active member of  -0.0115 -0.0159 -0.0152 -0.0151 -0.0134 -0.0207 
religious community (0.0138) (0.0156) (0.0159) (0.0159) (0.0142) (0.0155) 
       
Foreign business corruption      0.0114 
(dummy)      (0.0144) 
Local business corruption      -0.0377*** 
(dummy)      (0.0130) 
       
Country Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
Observations 19,548 15,280 14,891 14,891 18,987 13,184 
Notes: Probit marginal effects reported. The corresponding standard errors are clustered by country and region 
and reported in parentheses.*, **, and *** indicates significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. 
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3.2 Robustness and Extensions 
Thus far we have used dummy indicators of trust. The main reasons for this is ease of 
interpretation and the fact that the people can have different conceptions of terms like “a little 
bit” and “a lot.” Table 4 uses the full range of information available in each indicator and 
reports the marginal effects obtained from ordered probit models.  
The results are consistent with our main findings. A greater experience of public sector 
corruption is associated with an increase in the probability of trusting private corporations 
and small business “not at all” and “a little bit” and a decrease in the probability of trusting 
them “a lot” and “a very great deal.” For trust in local traders the pattern is slightly different 
but still consistent with our findings above. Experiencing corruption increases the probability 
of not trusting local traders at all and decreases the probability of expressing any degree of 
trust in them. The same patterns are evident with regards to the perception of political 
corruption.  Our results are therefore robust in this regard.  
Some papers in the literature referenced above have found that ideology can be a strong 
correlate of trust. In the case of trust in market institutions this could be a particularly 
important factor. The Afrobarometer allows us to consider some broad aspects of ideology. 
Table 5 includes evaluations of the government’s handling of price stability and satisfaction 
with the reduced role the government plays in the economy. The first, third, and fifth columns 
of Table 5 show that these factors do predict higher trust in the private sector but our main 
result holds. The significance of these factors supports the notion that peoples’ appraisals of 
the public and private spheres are interlinked. We also allow the respondent’s attitudes and 
beliefs regarding the desirability or acceptability of protectionism, inequality, and the market 
economy to enter the specification. None of these factors are significant and their inclusion 
does not change our key result. 
One might contend that our result is merely picking up the negative effect of experiencing 
bribery on interpersonal or generalised trust. Businesses are run by people and so if 
experiencing corruption lowers trust in people in general then it could lower trust in the 
private sector. Ideally we would like to include a measure of interpersonal trust in our models 
and see if experiencing bribery is a significant predictor of private sector trust once 
interpersonal trust is controlled for. Unfortunately, Round 2 of the Afrobarometer does not 
include such a variable.  Round  3 does but lacks the information regarding trust in the private  
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TABLE 4: Robustness: Ordered Probit Models 
 
 Trust in Private Corporations 
How much do you trust? Not at all A little bit A lot A very great deal 
     
Bribery experience 0.0042*** 0.0020*** -0.0034*** -0.0028*** 
(0-12 scale) (0.0015) (0.0008) (0.0012) (0.0010) 
Corruption Perceptions 0.011*** 0.0053*** -0.0089*** -0.0074*** 
(0-9 scale) (0.0026) (0.0014) (0.0022) (0.0018) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 13,732 13,732 13,732 13,732 
 
 Trust in Small Businesses 
How much do you trust? Not at all A little bit A lot A very great deal 
     
Bribery experience 0.0036*** 0.002*** -0.0032*** -0.0023*** 
(0-12 scale) (0.0014) (0.0008) (0.0013) (0.0009) 
Corruption Perceptions 0.0089*** 0.0048*** -0.0079*** -0.0057*** 
(0-9 scale) (0.0022) (0.0013) (0.0020) (0.0014) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 14,887 14,887 14,887 14,887 
 
 Trust in Local Traders 
How much do you trust? Not at all A little bit A lot A very great deal 
     
Bribery experience 0.0047*** -0.0020*** -0.0039*** -0.0028*** 
(0-12 scale) (0.0013) (0.0007) (0.0011) (0.0008) 
Corruption Perceptions 0.008*** -0.0035*** -0.0067*** -0.0048*** 
(0-9 scale) (0.0023) (0.0011) (0.002) (0.0014) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 14,891 14,891 14,891 14,891 
 
Notes:  Ordered Probit marginal effects reported. The corresponding standard errors are clustered by country 
and region and reported in parentheses.*, **, and *** indicates significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels 
respectively. Each specification includes the individual characteristics from the previous tables and country 
dummies. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
14 
 
 
TABLE 5: Robustness: Attitudes and Ideology 
 
 Private 
Corporations 
Small 
Businesses 
Local 
Traders 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
Bribery experience -0.00859*** -0.00939*** -0.00598** -0.00662** -0.00715** -0.00794*** 
(0-12 scale) (0.00327) (0.00304) (0.00298) (0.00312) (0.00284) (0.00292) 
Corruption Perceptions -0.0128*** -0.0154*** -0.0116*** -0.0137*** -0.00901*** -0.0109*** 
(0-9 scale) (0.00375) (0.00364) (0.00321) (0.00313) (0.00345) (0.00351) 
Age 0.000282 0.000156 0.000143 0.000037 0.000017 -0.000026 
 (0.000433) (0.000416) (0.000326) (0.000335) (0.000360) (0.000359) 
Female -0.0263*** -0.0275*** -0.0254*** -0.0311*** -0.0377*** -0.0393*** 
 (0.00805) (0.00801) (0.00757) (0.00805) (0.00791) (0.00784) 
Some secondary  -0.0345** -0.0364** -0.0344** -0.0411*** -0.0422*** -0.0475*** 
education (0.0161) (0.0156) (0.0140) (0.0137) (0.0146) (0.0143) 
Secondary education -0.0749*** -0.0806*** -0.0896*** -0.102*** -0.0975*** -0.103*** 
 (0.0207) (0.0190) (0.0158) (0.0144) (0.0169) (0.0156) 
Some university  -0.0450* -0.0531** -0.0597*** -0.0795*** -0.0945*** -0.105*** 
education (0.0246) (0.0235) (0.0221) (0.0206) (0.0196) (0.0189) 
University education -0.0465 -0.0470 -0.0524 -0.0558 -0.0893*** -0.0854*** 
 (0.0345) (0.0323) (0.0385) (0.0351) (0.0314) (0.0305) 
Poverty index -0.00266 -0.00383** -0.00113 -0.00259 -0.000957 -0.00231 
(0-24 scale) (0.00190) (0.00186) (0.00178) (0.00173) (0.00169) (0.00164) 
Rural -0.0365** -0.0416** -0.0366** -0.0457*** -0.0391** -0.0450*** 
 (0.0172) (0.0172) (0.0170) (0.0162) (0.0154) (0.0147) 
Businessman 0.0162 0.0170 0.0457 0.0463* 0.0331 0.0404* 
 (0.0212) (0.0202) (0.0283) (0.0254) (0.0258) (0.0226) 
Professional worker -0.0342 -0.0285 -0.00471 0.00234 -0.00608 0.00112 
 (0.0230) (0.0226) (0.0247) (0.0235) (0.0245) (0.0253) 
Government worker 0.00889 0.0128 0.0200 0.0236 -0.00211 0.000518 
 (0.0269) (0.0274) (0.0262) (0.0263) (0.0267) (0.0262) 
Farmer 0.0197 0.0256* 0.0260* 0.0213 0.00506 0.0107 
 (0.0144) (0.0144) (0.0144) (0.0131) (0.0120) (0.0118) 
Active member of  -0.0274** -0.0253* -0.0223 -0.0140 -0.0199 -0.0129 
religious community (0.0134) (0.0138) (0.0152) (0.0153) (0.0163) (0.0162) 
Protectionism  0.0145  -0.00296  -0.00421 
  (0.0123)  (0.0126)  (0.0133) 
Inequality  0.0160  0.0121  0.00242 
  (0.0130)  (0.0127)  (0.0120) 
Market economy  -0.000617  0.0180  0.0168 
  (0.0158)  (0.0131)  (0.0124) 
Price stability 0.0645***  0.0556***  0.0447***  
 (0.0138)  (0.0146)  (0.0144)  
Government’s  0.0507***  0.0426***  0.0482***  
economic role (0.0140)  (0.0141)  (0.0143)  
       
Country Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
Observations 12,687 13,008 13,660 14,035 13,663 14,040 
Notes: Probit marginal effects reported. The corresponding standard errors are clustered by country and region 
and reported in parentheses.*, **, and *** indicates significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. 
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sector. We therefore take a different approach. We use the Round 3 information regarding 
interpersonal trust and see if bribery experience is a significant predictor of this form of trust. 
From the question “Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or 
that you must be very careful in dealing with people?” we generate a dummy variable that 
takes a value of one if the answer is “Most people can be trusted” and zero if the answer is 
“You must be very careful.” 83.26% of the sample gave the latter answer. Barring a slight 
change to what is included in the poverty index the explanatory variables are the same as 
those used in the analysis of private sector trust using the Round 2 data. 
Table 6 presents the results of this analysis. In none of our specifications is an experience of 
corruption statistically significantly related to interpersonal trust - even when perceptions are 
excluded in Column 1. This offers some defence to the charge that our result regarding 
private sector trust is simply reflecting an effect of corruption experiences on trust in general. 
While this puts us at odds with some of the findings in the existing literature, it is important 
to note that in common with much of the literature our results indicate that perceptions of 
political corruption are associated with lower interpersonal trust. As to the discrepancy 
between our finding and those of others’ regarding the effect experiences of corruption have 
on interpersonal trust, we suspect that context probably matters very strongly for this 
relationship. In an environment where corruption is a regular occurrence in one’s life it may 
be the case that a recent history of involvement with bribery does not alter one’s opinions of 
people in general. 
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TABLE 6: Interpersonal Trust 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)  
       
Bribery experience 0.00056  0.0006  0.00048  
(0-12 scale) (0.00047)  (0.0005)  (0.00048)  
Corruption Perceptions  -0.005*** -0.0053*** -0.0052***   
(0-9 scale)  (0.0018) (0.0018) (0.0018)   
Bribery     -0.0062   
experience (dummy)    (0.0103)   
Trust in      0.04***  
courts (dummy)     (0.008)  
       
Age 0.00049*** 0.0005*** 0.00053*** 0.0005** 0.00052***  
 (0.00018) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002)  
Female -0.0011 0.0036 0.0039 0.0037 -0.0016  
 (0.0053) (0.0055) (0.0055) (0.0055) (0.0052)  
Some  -0.0336*** -0.0347*** -0.0348*** -0.0354*** -0.031***  
secondary education (0.0083) (0.0086) (0.0086) (0.0086) (0.008)  
Secondary  -0.0297*** -0.0324*** -0.0308*** -0.0314*** -0.025**  
education (0.0103) (0.011) (0.0111) (0.011) (0.01)  
Some  -0.0553*** -0.053*** -0.0523*** -0.0526*** -0.051***  
university education (0.0119) (0.0117) (0.0117) (0.0117) (0.0119)  
University  -0.0132 -0.0067 -0.0071 -0.0073 -0.0078  
education (0.0196) (0.022) (0.0217) (0.0217) (0.0196)  
Poverty index -0.0003 -0.00004 -0.00012 -0.00003 -0.0003  
(0-24 scale) (0.00078) (0.00083) (0.00085) (0.0008) (0.0008)  
Rural -0.0323*** -0.0304*** -0.0298*** -0.029*** -0.0313***  
 (0.0093) (0.0098) (0.0098) (0.0099) (0.0091)  
Businessman -0.0078 -0.0111 -0.0119 -0.0127 -0.0038  
 (0.0123) (0.0130) (0.0127) (0.0128) (0.0127)  
Professional  -0.0164 -0.0166 -0.0185 -0.019 -0.018  
worker (0.0173) (0.0186) (0.0186) (0.0185) (0.017)  
Government  -0.0298* -0.0356** -0.035* -0.036** -0.03*  
worker (0.0166) (0.0162) (0.0165) (0.0164) (0.0163)  
Farmer 0.013* 0.0136 0.014 0.0145 0.013*  
 (0.0076) (0.0091) (0.009) (0.009) (0.0079)  
Active member  0.0034 -0.0012 -0.0016 -0.0016 0.0037  
of religious community (0.0074) (0.0082) (0.0082) (0.0082) (0.0075)  
Country Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  
Observations 22,365 17,335 17,085 17,085 21,150  
Notes: Probit marginal effects reported. The corresponding standard errors are clustered by country 
and region and reported in parentheses.*, **, and *** indicates significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% 
levels respectively. 
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One environmental factor that could be of particular importance to the trust-corruption 
relationship is whether the individual is living in a democracy. The theoretical model of 
Mohtadi and Roe (2003) and the empirical analysis of Rock (2009) suggest that democracy is 
an important factor with regards to the prevalence of corruption and that corruption follows 
an inverted U shape as the democracy matures. In addition to differing levels of corruption, 
norms and expectations regarding behaviour and punishment may be different in a context of 
autocratic rule and such differences could in turn influence how people react and adapt to an 
experience of corruption. To see if our relationships of interest vary according to regime type, 
we split the sample using the Polity IV measure which takes values from -10 (autocracy) to 
10 (full democracy) (Marshall, 2013). A score of 6 or greater is taken to reflect a democracy. 
We take the average value of the Polity measure over the period 1994-2003. Table 7 shows 
that in the both types of regime bribery experience is negatively associated with trust in big 
private corporations. However, the estimated magnitude of this negative spill-over is greater 
in democracies. This difference in magnitude is also evident with regards to the other 
dimensions of private sector trust although the statistical significance of these marginal 
effects falls short of the 5% level for the most part. The corruption perceptions variable is 
always significant and interestingly the size of the association seems to be less influenced by 
regime type than in the case of the experience variable. We conclude from this exercise that 
while democracy may strengthen the relationship between experiencing corruption and 
private sector trust, such a relationship is evident in both broad regime types (at least with 
regards to big private corporations). 
We noted above that our results may suffer from reverse causality arising from a tendency for 
people with little trust in the private sector to utilise the public sector more readily or more 
often. To address this, we re-ran our main models and our sample splits replacing the 
individual bribery experience variable with the regional (i.e. sub-national survey area) 
average of the bribery experience indicator. Table 8 presents the results. Columns 1, 4, and 7 
use the full sample and the results support our main finding. The greater the average bribery 
experience in an individual’s region, the less likely he or she is to trust the institutions of the 
private sector.  This is also true when we restrict our sample to non-democratic regimes and 
in all cases bar trust in small business when we examine only democracies. Once again the 
marginal effect of bribery experience on trust in private corporations is substantially larger in 
democracies than in non-democratic regimes though the magnitudes are similar in each 
regime type for the other trust outcomes. 
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TABLE 7: Sample Splits by Democracy 
 
 NON DEMOCRACIES DEMOCRACIES 
 Private 
Corporations 
Small 
Businesses 
Local 
Traders 
Private 
Corporations 
Small 
Businesses 
Local 
Traders 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
Bribery experience -0.0071** -0.0047 -0.0068** -0.0191** -0.0141* -0.012* 
(0-12 scale) (0.00337) (0.00334) (0.00315) (0.00828) (0.00814) (0.00689) 
Corruption Perceptions -0.0172*** -0.0147*** -0.0105** -0.0137** -0.0126*** -0.0111** 
(0-9 scale) (0.00473) (0.00451) (0.00487) (0.00548) (0.00413) (0.00462) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 8,180 9,018 9,072 5,552 5,869 5,819 
Notes: Probit marginal effects reported. The corresponding standard errors are clustered by country and region 
and reported in parentheses.*, **, and *** indicates significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. 
Each specification includes the individual characteristics from tables 1, 2, and 3, and country dummies. 
 
 
 
 
 
TABLE 8: Robustness: Regional Average Bribery Experience 
 Private Corporations Small Businesses Local Traders 
 ALL DEM NON-DEM ALL DEM NON-DEM ALL DEM NON-DEM 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)        (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Average Bribery 
experience 
-0.0917*** -0.1618*** -0.076*** -0.0751*** -0.082 -0.073*** -0.0848*** -0.095** -0.084*** 
(0-12 scale) (0.0214) (0.051) (0.0225) (0.0219) (0.058) (0.0231) (0.0192) (0.0458) (0.0210) 
Corruption Perceptions -0.0156*** -0.014*** -0.0165*** -0.0132*** -0.0128*** -0.0136*** -0.0103*** -0.0111** -0.0094** 
(0-9 scale) (0.00355) (0.0054) (0.00450) (0.00304) (0.0041) (0.00422) (0.0033) (0.0045) (0.00455) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 14,037 5,603 8,434 15,265 5,933 9,332 15,280 5,886 9,394 
 
Notes: Probit marginal effects reported. The corresponding standard errors are clustered by country and region 
and reported in parentheses.*, **, and *** indicates significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. 
Each specification includes the individual characteristics from tables 1, 2, and 3, and country dummies 
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Finally, in Table 9 we explore whether public sector corruption in certain situations might be 
particularly damaging in terms of private sector trust. To do this we include a dummy for 
each corruption situation in our models. These take a value of one if the respondent has any 
experience of paying a bribe in the situation in question and zero otherwise. The results of 
this exercise paint an interesting picture. Having to pay a bribe for a household service is 
significant in five out of six of our models. Only in the case of trust in small businesses where 
we control for perceptions of corruption is it insignificant. It is interesting that the situation 
which is most strongly associated with lowering trust in the private sector is also the situation 
that is most similar to a private sector transaction. The survey prompts people to think of 
services “like piped water, electricity, or phone.” Services like these can be provided by 
private sector corporations in many countries. One might be tempted to conclude that the 
endogeneity problem outlined above is valid. This was the story in which low trust in private 
sector corporations leads individuals to engage more with the public sector and thus they are 
more likely to face bribe demands. It could also be the case that low trust in the private sector 
leads people to seek out and bribe an influential public servant to help get, for example, a 
phone connection. However, we must note that the effect of having to pay a bribe for services 
such as these on trust in local traders is also statistically significant. Even if we suspect this 
particular endogeneity problem is driving the result regarding trust in big private 
corporations, this story does not explain away the result regarding trust in local market 
traders.6 The only other situation where we see any evidence of a statistically meaningful 
effect is for trust in small businesses. Here we see some evidence that having to pay a bribe to 
get a document or permit lowers trust. 
 
 
4 CONCLUSIONS 
This paper has demonstrated that there is a statistically significant and meaningful 
relationship between sub-Saharan African survey respondents’ direct experiences of public 
sector corruption and their trust in the private sector. Exposure to petty public sector 
corruption in the form of bribe paying is strongly associated with a lower probability of 
trusting the private sector. This relationship is evident with regards to trust in all levels of the 
private sector from big private corporations to small local market traders. It is robust to the 
inclusion  of  perceptions  of  political  corruption  and  trust  in  the institutions  of  the  state.    
                                                          
6 If we include trust in private corporations as an explanatory variable for trust in local traders we still find a 
significant marginal effect of bribes for household services on trust in local traders.  
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TABLE 9: Do Some Corruption Contexts Matter More than Others? 
 
 Private 
Corporations 
Small 
Businesses 
Local 
Traders 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
Bribe for documents -0.0196 -0.0151 -0.0287** -0.0242* -0.00942 -0.00563 
dummy (0.0136) (0.0150) (0.0145) (0.0147) (0.0135) (0.0145) 
Bribe for school -0.0184 -0.0219 -0.0131 -0.0116 -0.0241 -0.0265 
dummy (0.0229) (0.0237) (0.0201) (0.0208) (0.0204) (0.0205) 
Bribe for service -0.0530*** -0.0435** -0.0408** -0.0278 -0.0607*** -0.0567*** 
dummy (0.0197) (0.0207) (0.0180) (0.0187) (0.0167) (0.0181) 
Bribe to police -0.00213 0.00753 0.00478 0.0125 0.00955 0.0239 
dummy (0.0166) (0.0177) (0.0169) (0.0183) (0.0172) (0.0193) 
Corruption Perceptions  -0.0157***  -0.0137***  -0.0110*** 
(0-9 scale)  (0.00369)  (0.00319)  (0.00346) 
Age 0.000149 0.000118 -0.000134 0.000004 -0.000093 -0.000073 
 (0.000353) (0.000417) (0.000307) (0.000326) (0.000314) (0.000357) 
Female -0.0230*** -0.0262*** -0.0221*** -0.0286*** -0.0239*** -0.0367*** 
 (0.00706) (0.00815) (0.00699) (0.00782) (0.00742) (0.00781) 
Some secondary  -0.0394*** -0.0352** -0.0507*** -0.0401*** -0.0541*** -0.0459*** 
education (0.0130) (0.0157) (0.0121) (0.0136) (0.0123) (0.0143) 
Secondary education -0.0916*** -0.0816*** -0.112*** -0.0990*** -0.115*** -0.102*** 
 (0.0172) (0.0192) (0.0129) (0.0145) (0.0138) (0.0156) 
Some university  -0.0568*** -0.0494** -0.0824*** -0.0686*** -0.105*** -0.100*** 
education (0.0212) (0.0232) (0.0181) (0.0204) (0.0164) (0.0183) 
University education -0.0573* -0.0442 -0.0643** -0.0488 -0.0948*** -0.0841*** 
 (0.0305) (0.0327) (0.0322) (0.0354) (0.0288) (0.0311) 
Poverty index -0.00351** -0.00376** -0.00278* -0.00220 -0.00276* -0.00181 
(0-24 scale) (0.00163) (0.00181) (0.00150) (0.00167) (0.00142) (0.00157) 
Rural -0.0340** -0.0372** -0.0398*** -0.0413** -0.0378*** -0.0413*** 
 (0.0147) (0.0167) (0.0142) (0.0161) (0.0137) (0.0149) 
Businessman 0.00404 0.0130 0.0413* 0.0401 0.0304 0.0335 
 (0.0185) (0.0198) (0.0242) (0.0255) (0.0217) (0.0230) 
Professional worker -0.0412** -0.0372* -0.0124 -0.00790 -0.0243 -0.00836 
 (0.0204) (0.0220) (0.0212) (0.0235) (0.0244) (0.0256) 
Government worker 0.00784 0.0137 0.0119 0.0191 -0.00263 0.000970 
 (0.0255) (0.0263) (0.0232) (0.0253) (0.0235) (0.0254) 
Farmer 0.0195 0.0227 0.0162 0.0221* 0.0108 0.00850 
 (0.0139) (0.0139) (0.0127) (0.0132) (0.0109) (0.0116) 
Active member of  -0.0163 -0.0219 -0.00980 -0.0124 -0.0111 -0.0145 
religious community (0.0124) (0.0139) (0.0135) (0.0152) (0.0138) (0.0158) 
 (0.0257) (0.0371) (0.0331) (0.0314) (0.0316) (0.0392) 
Country Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 17,562 13,732 19,508 14,887 19,548 14,891 
Notes: Probit marginal effects reported. The corresponding standard errors are clustered by country and region and 
reported in parentheses.*, **, and *** indicates significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. 
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Our result also survives the inclusion of attitudinal and ideological factors that could shape 
one’s views of private enterprise.  
Given that trust in businesses is likely to be vital for the efficient functioning of an economy, 
this paper therefore points to a previously unknown and potentially sizable cost of petty 
corruption. Future and further research on these important and interesting issues could be 
carried out using a lab experiment. Such an approach has been taken recently by Banerjee 
(2015) in his study of interpersonal trust. In the current context, a well-designed experiment 
could offer additional, stronger, and causal evidence on the effect of public sector corruption 
experiences on private sector trust. In addition one could examine the effects of different 
types of corruption (harassment or collusive, for example). The mechanism though which 
corruption influences this particular form of trust could also be studied as could the potential 
for policies and interventions to attenuate such spill-overs.  
Our central finding is that improvements in terms of citizens’ exposure to petty corruption 
may yield a dividend in terms of trust in the private sector, and thus perhaps in terms of 
economic efficiency, even if their perceptions of corruption are unchanged. This is an 
encouraging conclusion for anti-corruption actors and adds yet another compelling argument 
to the case for anti-corruption efforts. 
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APPENDICES 
 
TABLE A1: Summary Statistics and Description of the Variables 
Variable Mean 
(SD) 
Obs Description 
Dependent Variables   
Trust in 
Private 
Corporations 
(0-3 scale) 
1.33  
(0.92) 
18990 Level of trust in private corporations. See main text. 
Trust in Small 
Businesses 
(0-3 scale) 
1.30 
(0.89) 
21253 Level of trust in small shops. See main text. 
Trust in Local 
Traders 
(0-3 scale) 
1.28 
(0.90) 
21322 Level of trust in local traders. See main text. 
Trust in 
Private 
Corporations 
(dummy) 
0.42 
(0.49) 
18990 Dummy for the level of trust in private corporations. See main text. 
Trust in Small 
Businesses 
(dummy) 
0.38 
(0.49) 
21253 Dummy for the level of trust in small shops. See main text. 
Trust in Local 
Traders 
(dummy) 
0.38 
(0.48) 
21322 Dummy for the level of trust in local traders. See main text. 
    
Bribery Experience 
Bribery 
experience  
(0-12 scale) 
0.72 
(1.78) 
23495 Index of bribery experience. See main text. 
Bribery 
experience 
(dummy) 
0.23 
(0.42) 
23495 Dummy variable, equals “1” if the respondent has any bribery experience. 
    
Bribe for 
documents 
(0-3 scale) 
0.23 
(0.63) 
24015 Bribery experience in getting document or permit, component of the bribery experience 
index. See main text. 
Bribe for 
documents 
(dummy) 
0.14 
(0.35) 
24015 Dummy variable, equals “1” if the respondent has bribery experience in getting 
document or permit. 
Bribe for 
school 
(0-3 scale) 
0.14 
(0.51) 
24108 Bribery experience in getting a child into school, component of the bribery experience 
index. See main text. 
Bribe for 
school 
(dummy) 
0.09 
(0.29) 
24108 Dummy variable, equals “1” if the respondent has bribery experience in getting a child 
into school. 
Bribe for 
service 
(0-3 scale) 
0.145 
(0.53) 
23748 Bribery experience in getting a household service, component of the bribery experience 
index. See main text. 
Bribe for 
service 
(dummy) 
0.08 
(0.28) 
23748 Dummy variable, equals “1” if the respondent has bribery experience in getting a 
household service. 
Bribe to 
police 
(0-3 scale) 
0.23 
(0.67) 
23951 Bribery experience in avoiding a problem with the police, component of the bribery 
experience index. See main text. 
 0.12 23951 Dummy variable, equals “1” if the respondent has bribery experience in avoiding a 
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Bribe to 
police 
(dummy) 
(0.33) problem with the police. 
    
Control Variables 
Corruption 
Perceptions 
(0-9 scale) 
3.77 
(2.26) 
17737 Index of political corruption perception. See main text. 
Corrupt 
president 
(0-3 scale) 
1.12 
(0.90) 
18750 Perception of the corruption in the president’s office, component of the political 
corruption perception index. See main text. 
Corrupt 
leaders 
(0-3 scale) 
1.23 
(0.83) 
19658 Perception of the corruption among the elected leaders, component of the political 
corruption perception index. See main text. 
Corrupt 
government 
officials (0-3 
scale) 
1.38 
(0.82) 
20413 Perception of the corruption among government officials, component of the political 
corruption perception index. See main text. 
Age 36.3 
(14.8) 
23665 “How old were you at your last birthday?” 
Female 0.50 
(0.50) 
24301 Equals “1” if the respondent is female. 
Some 
Secondary 
Education 
0.36 
(0.48) 
24229 “What is the highest level of education you have completed?” 
Primary or Some Secondary Education 
Secondary 
Education 
0.15 
(0.36) 
24229 Secondary Education 
Some 
University 
Education 
0.08 
(0.28) 
24229 Post-Secondary or Some University Education 
University 
Education 
0.02 
(0.15) 
24229 University Complete or Postgraduate Education 
Poverty index 
(0-24 scale) 
8.69 
(5.32) 
23625 Sum of 0-4 scale indices of shortages of food, water, medical care, electricity, fuel for 
cooking and cash income. Larger numbers indicate more poverty. See 
www.afrobarometer.org for details of the individual questions. 
Rural 0.38 
(0.48) 
24301 Equals “1” if the Primary Sampling Unit is rural. 
Businessman 0.06 
(0.22) 
24127 Equals “1” if the respondent’s main occupation is a businessman. 
Professional 
worker 
0.03 
(0.18) 
24127 Equals “1” if the respondent’s main occupation is a professional worker. 
Government 
worker 
0.03 
(0.17) 
24127 Equals “1” if the respondent’s main occupation is a government worker. 
Farmer 0.32 
(0.47) 
24127 Equals “1” if the respondent’s main occupation is a farmer. 
Active 
member of 
religious 
community 
0.53 
(0.50) 
23130 Equals “1” if the respondent an active member of an official leader of the religious 
group. 
Trust in 
Courts  
(0-3 scale) 
1.50 
(0.93) 
23006 “How much do you trust courts, or haven’t you heard enough about them to say? 
Scale from “0”=“Not at all” to 3=“A very great deal”. 
Trust in 
Courts 
(dummy) 
0.49 
(0.50) 
23006 Dummy variable, equals “1” if the answer to the question above is “A lot” or “A very 
great deal”. 
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Foreign 
business 
corruption  
(0-3 scale) 
1.32 
(0.88) 
18242 “How many of the foreign businessmen do you think are involved in corruption, or 
haven’t you heard enough about them to say?” Scale from “0”=“None” to “3”=”All”.  
Foreign 
business 
corruption 
(dummy) 
0.35 
(0.48) 
18242 Dummy variable, equals “1” if the answer to the question above is “2” or “3”. 
Local 
business 
corruption  
(0-3 scale) 
1.27 
(0.83) 
19953 “How many of the local businessmen do you think are involved in corruption, or haven’t 
you heard enough about them to say?” Scale from “0”=“None” to “3”=”All”. 
Local 
business 
corruption 
(dummy) 
0.32 
(0.47) 
19953 Dummy variable, equals “1” if the answer to the question above is “2” or “3”. 
Protectionism 0.67 
(0.47) 
22315 Equals “1” if the respondent thinks that “we must protect producers within our own 
country by imposing tariffs that makes imported goods more expensive”. 
Inequality 0.38 
(0.49) 
22656 Equals “1” if the respondent thinks that “it is alright to have large differences of wealth 
because those who work hard deserve to be rewarded”. 
Market 
economy 
0.47 
(0.50) 
22753 Equals “1” if the respondent thinks that “a free market economy is preferable to a 
government-run economy”. 
Price stability 0.34 
(0.47) 
23126 Equals “1” if the respondent thinks that current government is handling the stability of 
prices fairly/very well. 
Government’s 
economic role 
0.47 
(0.50) 
28942 Equals “1” if the respondent satisfied with the reduced role of the government in the 
economy. 
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Trust in Private Corporations 1        
Trust in Small Businesses 0.6325 1       
Trust in Local Traders 0.5611 0.7727 1      
Bribery Experience -0.0708 -0.0446 -0.0339 1     
Political Corruption -0.0753 -0.0716 -0.0555 0.1056 1    
Foreign Business Corruption -0.0343 -0.0396 -0.0470 0.0312 0.3750 1   
Local Business Corruption -0.0379 -0.0484 -0.0428 0.0379 0.3805 0.6244 1 
 Trust in Courts 0.4025 0.3831 0.3562 -0.0911 -0.1549 -0.0362 -0.0531 1 
 
